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PROMOTERS' CONTRACTS
By Frank J. Mannix of the Denver Bar
HE development of systems of supervision and investigation as to the promotion of corporations, with a view
towards weeding out the unsound or the fraudulent,
may, to some extent, have tended to render the promoters of
corporations more conservative. The millennium, however,
is far from being at hand, and the day of the Western Surety
Company and kindred promotions is not yet a thing of the
past.. So long as there are persons of ability who are unprincipled in their methods and unduly technical in their
maneuvers, questions as to a corporation's rights and liabilities arising under a contract made with its promoters, or by
them with others, will continue to appear. It is to such questions that this paper will be briefly addressed.
The first question to be considered is as to what is a promoter. Generally he is one Who alone or with others takes it
upon himself to organize a corporation; to procure the necessary execution of the articles of incorporation, to file the articles with the proper officers and see that a certificate of incorporation is issued for the company. Ordinarily his work
terminates when the company has been organized and the
directors have taken over its affairs. It is a question of fact
and not of law as to when the promoter commences operations
as such, and when he ceases to be such. While he acts as a
promoter he occupies a fiduciary relationship towards the
corporation and also towards the subscribers to the company's
stock. It is important, therefore, to determine just when he
commences to be a promoter and just when he ceases to be
such. Quite frequently he may, after the organization of the
company, retain his character as a promoter, by dominating
the policies of the company, without being an officer or director thereof. In such cases he retains his rights and obligations
as a promoter.
In all cases where a corporation can be shown to have
become a party to a contract, made by or with its promoters,
the following circumstances must be shown by the pleading
and established by the evidence:
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1. The parties to the contract must have mutually expected that a
certain corporation was to be organized.
2. That the contract shows that it was to be with the company that
was expected to be organized.
3. That the organization would be such that the contract was one of
such a character as to be proper for the corporation to make under its powers,
as shown by its articles of incorporation.
4. That the persons who control the corporation were individually
acquainted with the material provisions of the contract, and
5. That after the corporation came into existence that it did perform
certain corporate acts that recognized the existence of the contract.

We will try to discuss these matters in their order:
Circumstance No. 1: It is hard to conceive of any case
coming up under the title of this thesis where much attention
must be given to this requirement. It needs no extended discussion. A mere statement of it as a circumstance required
to be pleaded is probably sufficient. The parties referred to
include the promoter or the promoters on one side and the
other contracting parties on the other side.
CircumstanceNo. 2: It is not required that the contract
show that it was made to be with the company in the exact
name under which it was actually organized, if in fact it was
the same corporation that was contemplated. This qualification of the rule is established in Colorado in a case decided
in 1894 by the Colorado Court of Appeals. It is the case of
the Colorado Land & Water Company vs. Adams, reported
in 5. C. A. 190. The facts in this case as stated in the opinion
were, in a general way, as follows: One Henry was soliciting
subscriptions for water rights in a corporation that he was
then contemplating organizing. The memorandum of the
contract with the plaintiff was a note made January 28, 1890.
A few days later the corporation was organized. Henry was
the president of the company and as such negotiated further
with the plaintiff in regard to the contract. The name of the
contemplated corporation, as stated in the memorandum was
'The Colorado Land & Canal Company". The corporation
as organized was "The Colorado Land & Water Company".
The court held that the difference in the name of the company
as organized was immaterial, that the Corporation that was
drganized was the one contemplated by the parties. It was
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a case of specific performance, and relief was granted to plaintiff.
Circumstance No. 3: This is a matter that does not require extended discussion. The forms of articles of incorporation as now in use are all so general in their powers that
it is only the exceptional case when the question, would arise
as to the lack of the authority of the company. However, it
is undoubtedly an essential averment to be made in the complaint on any case of this character.
Circumstance No. 4: This is one of the circumstances
which is more frequently discussed in such cases. The general rule is well established that the directors and officers of
a corporation are chargeable as said officers or directors with
the knowledge of facts that they each had individually as promoters of the company. It is clear, that those who control the
corporation after it has been formed bring the knowledge to
the corporation that they had as promoters. The knowledge
of the minority members of the board of directors or that of
some of the officers charged with the business, is not sufficient
to charge the corporation with knowledge. The assumption
of knowledge on the part of the corporation can only be sustained where the controlling force of the corporation has that
knowledge. In those cases where the controlling power of
the corporation is vested in persons who were not previously
promoters of the company, an entirely different situation
exists, then actuai knowledge of the individuals who are in
control of the affairs of the company, of all the material provisions of the contract must be shown before the corporation
can be considered a party to the contract.
There are some qualifications of the general rule that the
knowledge had by a promoter is imputed to the company by
reason of the fact that he later becomes a member of the board
of directors or an officer of the company. A corporation is
not charged with notice of facts known to the promoter in a
transaction between him and a corporation in which -he is
acting for himself and not for the corporation. The general
rule, that the knowledge of the agent is imputed to the principal, rests upon the presumption that the agent will disclose
what it is his principal's business to know and the agent's duty
to impart. Where the facts are such that by reason of the
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selfish interests of the promoter or for any other reason there
is an antagonism between the company and the promoter, thepl
the reason for the rule ceases and the rule fails.
Circumstance No. 5: This is the one circumstance that
is referred to in the greater majority of opinions on these cases.
The circumstance is that after the corporation comes into
existence that it did perform certain corporate acts that recognized the existence of the contract.
The general rule under this circumstance is as follows:
it is not essential to bind the corporation that a formal action
be taken by the officers and directors in approving the contract, to ratify it. Any conduct by those in charge of the company's affairs, or acts, deeds or correspondence that show the
company is interested in the contract and dealing therein is
sufficient to make the contract that of the company.
There is a Colorado case which has followed this general
rule in substance. It is the case of Possell vs. Smith, reported
in 39 Colo. 129. This was a case where corporate liability
was claimed on a contract with the promoters of a company
for the purchase of an air compressor. It does not appear in
the opinion as to whether delivery of the compressor was made
before or after the organization of the company nor does it
appear whether any of the promoters constituted the officers
or the directors of the company. The rule announced was
that, when the corporation used the compressor and the directors individually had knowledge of all the material facts regarding the contract, that the company was liable. It was also
held specifically that it was not necessary for the board of
directors in a body, or at a meeting assembled, to formally
adopt and ratify the contract in order to establish the liability
of the company. The facts showed that the company used the
compressor; that a majority of the directors of the company
knew all the material facts involved in the contract; and the
knowledge that they had, as individuals, of such facts, established the liability of the corporation.
There is another Colorado case which will undoubtedly
be of keen interest because it establishes the right of an attorney to fees charged for drafting the articles of incorporation of a corporation, and supervising the filing thereof. The
facts shown were that plaintiff had served as the attorney for
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the company for several years after it was organized. The
real point in issue before the Supreme Court was as to the
attorney's right to compensation for his services to the promoters. The court approved the rule that where the promoters and directors were the same persons after the corporation came into existence, that was in fact a ratification of the
promoters' contract of employment, and that no formal acts by
the board of directors or the officers of the company were
necessary to establish the company's liability on the contract.
The case referred to is Expansion Company vs. Campbell, 62
Colo. 410.
There is a line of cases wherein the courts have required
that a showing be made of actual corporate action of ratification, before the corporation can be considered to be a party to
the contract. This rule is laid down in Illinois, and was stated
in the case of Erd, et al., vs. Rapid Transit Corporation, and
reported in 206 Ill. App. 350. The opinion was handed down
in April, 1917. The matter involved attorney's fees for services rendered in perfecting the organization of the corporation, including the by-laws of the organization meeting, the
stockholders' meeting and that of the board of directors. The
evidence tended to show that the officers of the company and
the board of directors accepted the benefits of the plaintiff's
services. It appeared that the contract for the plaintiff's services was made with the promoters of the company and that
the same persons were thereafter the directors of the company,
and also that the company had received the full benefit of
plaintiff's services. The court took the position that as there
was no express corporate action specifically assuming the contract by the corporation that the corporation was not a party
to it. This is an extreme case and an exception to the general
rule established in other jurisdictions. It is the most extreme
case of this character that we have been able to find. The
court in deciding the case for the defendant corporation,
quoted with approval from 10 Cyc, 265, the following language:
"It is difficult to understand how the corporation is to be estopped by
accepting benefits it had no power to reject without uncreating itself."

The courts have done quite a bit of unnecessary theorizing
in order to state a good explanation of how a corporation can
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become a party to a contract which was made before the corporation came into existence. The frequency with which
this problem came up to the judiciary, and the equities that
were apparent in many of the cases, required that the rights
of persons who dealt with promoters in good faith should be
protected regardless of the theories upon which the protection was to be given.
Of the theories advanced to sustain the liability of a corporation upon contract of its promoters, the one stated in the
majority of the cases is that of ratification. This theory has
been the subject of very strong attacks both by the text writers
and the courts, and cannot be said to be an entirely satisfactory ground, however, it is the Colorado rule without any
criticisms or suggestions.
Another term that has met with more favor in describing what takes place when a corporation becomes liable upon
the contract made by a promoter is "Adoption". There is
little less objection to this term than there is to ratification, if
the contract has actually been effectuated between the promoter and the one seeking to enforce it, the strict principle of
contract, not to permit a third person to make himself a party
by mere adoption without any consideration flowing to or
from him, must be disregarded. The corporation can make
itself responsible for the acts and representations of a promoter by adoption. Adoption may be implied from the acts
or acquiescence of the corporation without any express acceptance. The corporation has knowingly received the benefit from the arrangement or understanding entered into by the
promoters, it will not be permitted to deny that it agreed to it.
There are numerous authorities in South Dakota, Texas, New
York, Minnesota, and in our own state in this regard.
There are two other grounds that have been suggested by
some Courts as the theory upon which the liability of a corporation upon a contract made with its promoters has been
sustained; the first of these is novation, that is that the corporation's liability is substituted for the liability of the promoter. The other is that the proposition made by the promoter was a continuing offer to be accepted or rejected by the
corporation when it came into being, and upon its acceptance,
becomes an original contract on its part. The theory of these
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last two grounds is material in affecting the personal liability
of the promoters. Neither of these grounds have been used
in, Colorado.
Much of the difficulty of this subject has resulted from the
fact that the first two grounds were the ones originally advanced, and that they were not strictly satisfactory, because it
was difficult, on scientific principles to see how a contract
made before a corporation came into being could be ratified
or adopted by it. On the other hand there was the injustice
and absurdity in denying liability of the corporation merely
because of the technicality that its incorporation so changed
the character of the operating forces which created the contract that it was not liable thereon, when the directing minds
continued to be the same after as before incorporation, and
all parties participating in the transaction intended and understood that the contract was to be that of the corporation.
The rule as to personal liability of a promoter for a contract made by him as such is governed by the general rules of
contracts. Presumably the contract is his. If he made it
with the general understanding that the contract was limited
to the corporation to be formed then he probably will escape
personal liability in regard to it. Only where the agreement is
specifically of that character will he escape personal liability.
Conceivably, there are circumstances where neither the
promoter or the corporation are liable on the contract sought
to be established. It is clear, however, that where the promoters of a company make a contract in the name of a proposed company, and thereafter fail to perfect the organization
of the company, then they are personally liable on the contract.
Every corporation formed must have its promoter. It
need not have a father and a mother, but it must have one of
them. Some person or persons must do the work required to
prepare the proper papers and obtain the articles of incorporation. In practically every case an attorney is employed
to perfect the incorporation. Other expenses must be incurred
before the corporation comes into existence. Fortunately in
nearly all of such cases there is no dispute about the discharge
of these expenses. It is only one case in a hundred where a
controversy comes up as to the payment of the expenses of incorporation. In each of these hundredth cases the same tech-
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nical question exists that the company before it is formed can
make no contracts, can incur no liabilities on a contract in its
name, and can claim no benefits by reason of such contract.
This discussion has been devoted almost in its entirety to the
questions as to the liabilities incurred under such contracts,
rather than the benefits obtained thereby. The reason for discussing the matter in such a way is that practically all of the
cases reported dealt with liabilities instead of benefits. The
contract in question, like all other contracts, works both ways.
The same rules apply whether the establishing of the contract will result in the imposition of liability or the bestowal
of a benefit.

